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Abstract
In 1993, the water providing service of Buenos Aires was privatized in order to increase
the number of constituents with water access and improve water quality.

The

government also needed an infusion of cash to pay off foreign debt and support a new
monetary policy pegged to the dollar. Given these two situations, privatization seemed to
provide the most logical answer to each of these problems. However, after ten years of
water rate increases that prohibited many citizens fi*om receiving water access, the state
renationalized water service in Buenos Aires,

Although privatization is generally

accepted as the most efficient means of running an organization, this economic policy
failed in Buenos Aires. The government did not have enough regulatory powers to insure
that the water service contract was followed. The foreign-run water service was able to
break its contract, charge extremely high rates, and keep its contract,

Therefore,

privatization does not always provide the best solution to a problem. It depends on the
level of development and regulation that exists within a society.

If there is not a

sufficiently developed system of regulation, then privatization cannot have success.
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Introduction
In 1991, Lydia Chavez lived in La Matanza, a poor neighborhood of Buenos
Aires, with her eight children, They had been waiting for a connection to the water
system for 14 years and were forced to use a pump in the backyard as their sole source of
water. The pump was only a few feet from their sewage pit, and water contamination left
Lydia’s children with stomach aches that required frequent visits to a local hospital. She
had no cleaner water because the government-run water system, Obras Samtarias de la
Nacion (OSN), did not have the capital to extend the system’s infrastructure to include
her neighborhood. Thus, Lydia and her eight children had to live without clean public
running water and contend with the effects of contamination.
Lydia was not unique: Many people living in the outlying areas of Buenos Aires
did not receive water from OSN because the government did not have the funds
necessary to extend pipelines into new areas or repair existing infrastructure. The water
system under OSN was inefficient and ineffective in delivering clean water to the people
of Buenos Aires. Water people did receive was

often contaminated as the result of rusted

pipes, system leaks, and insufficient water treatment and rebuilding an infrastructure in
such a state of disrepair would have been expensive. OSN did not have the funding or
expertise to take on a project of this magnitude and thus to guarantee the delivery of
water to the people of Buenos Aires. The malaise of OSN only served as a source of

^ “Dead in the Water.” Canadian Broadcasting Corporation News. 31 March 2004. ww.cbc.cayTifth/
deadinthe water/argentina.html

2

tension for the nation’s politicians struggling to fund it while allaying the fears offoreign
creditors.
During the 1990s, neoliberal policies became more prevalent in the developing
world. International lenders such as the IMF, World Bank, and US attached conditions
on loans issued to developing countries in order to influence their economic policies and
assure that an acceptable economic structure was maintained according to the so-called
Washington Consensus, The privatization of state assets was one of the conditions
placed on these loans, and it was generally agreed that private enterprise could

more

efficiently handle previously state-run industries. Government ownership had still been
the accepted model, despite egregious mismanagement of these compames durmg the
military regime of the late 1970s and early 1980s.
In 1993, Argentina’s federal, state, and local governments were in extreme debt
and faced mounting inflation. International creditors believed selling OSN would raise
capital and relieve the city of a major responsibility. An immediate cash infusion from
the sale of the company would decrease pressure

from international loans and allow the

economic
government to use more of its funds for other social programs, creating
benefits for all levels of society. It could alleviate the burden of international debt
without disenfranchising the poor; however, it would depend on how the situation
unfolded. Moreover, water-providing services could be improved through privatization,
increasing service area and improving service quality through the specialization that
privatization creates. The assumption was, moreover, that private industry would provide
rhf-anpr anoH«: anH thiiQ nctpnsihlv lower water ra.tes for the population of Buenos Air^s
—

^

—

-

~-j

Thus OSN was sold to the French water conglomerate of Suez and Vivendi to become
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Aguas Argentinas (AASA). Ten years later, however, AASA was repurchased by the
Argentine government. So why did the privatization of water fail in Buenos Aires? This
study on the failure of water privatization in Buenos Aires will answer this question by
weighing the economic benefits of such policies against their social ramifications.
Privatizations affect society to different degrees. The privatization of airlines has
minimal effects on the day-to-day lives of the average citizen. Those ofthe upper classes
who travel more fi'equently could be affected if airfare fluctuates exorbitantly, but they
are already in a better financial situation to handle such changes. On the other hand, the
privatization of water service has a direct impact on
members of society.

the everyday activities of all

Most importantly, the lower classes of society are the most

susceptible to changes in service rates and therefore the first to be excluded fi-om water
service if they can no longer pay.

This precarious situation for those on the

socioeconomic margins of society raises the question of what human rights people do
have to water given its innate qualities that make it a public good. Water, unlike air
travel, is vital for sustaining human life, not to mention an integral part of sanitation and
disease control.
In chapter one, I will discuss how cases of water privatization in Latin America
raise broader questions about the reach of privatization as an economic policy. Given
that humans depend on water for survival, many have asked whether water should ever
be privatized. Some critics of water privatizations argue that access to water should be
considered a basic human right and as such be protected under international law.
Proponents of water privatization, on the other hand, argue that water is no different from
other commodities that are being allocated in largely unregulated markets. To understand

4

the implication of this fundamental disagreement for the course of Latin American water
privatizations, it is crucial to include an analysis of the broader social, economic, and
philosophical implications of water privatization. In particular, this chapter will focus on
the applicability of international guidelines on human rights to the water issue. It also
examines the decision-making process of water consumers and providers when they
choose to either follow or break contractual agreements. Each side must weigh the
consequences for their decisions and determine which choice provides the most
advantageous result. Finally, this chapter will describe the steps to a proper decision
making cycle that creates a successful water-providing service.
Chapter two analyzes the fiscal backgroimd and the specific reasons for the
decision to privatize water in Buenos Aires. The military regime of the late 1970s and
early 1980s spent widely on ineffective programs and unwise political endeavors, such as
the war with Britain over control of the Malvinas. In such attempts to brandish Argentine
sovereignty and strength, the military regime had forced the nation deep into debt and
triple digit inflation, creating a seemingly insurmouiitflble economic crisis for the
succeeding governments. They would not just have to strengthen democratic rule, but
they would have to show ingenuity and creativity to carry the nation forward and make
up for the economic and political stagnation of the preceding regime,

Therefore, this

chapter will explain the ultimately unsuccessful economic policies enacted in Argentina
after the military regime which ultimately lead to the decision to privatize water.
The third chapter will analyze the story of water privatization in Buenos Aires. It
\i ri 11 <avr»

of the contract made be^veen the

and AASA, as well as how the agreement came into fhiition.

/-v-f* T3-1-1 4am r"\o
O

A^

X XXX

What were ASSA’s
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obligations and what was expected on their part from the water concession? The chapter
will then compare what AASA promised with what actually transpired, a discrepancy that
was the number one reason for the failure of water privatization. In addition, this chapter
will discuss what happened to settle the dispute and analyze the overarching economic
and social effects of privatization, revealing the broader implications of privatizing
innately public goods.
Chapter four compares water privatization in Buenos Aires to another case in
Latin America, the so-called “Water Wars” in Cochabamba (Bolivia).

A Spanish

conglomerate purchased the water rights for that city, but it took only months for massive
social protests to lead to a revocation of the contract. This chapter will reveal the factors
that created such social upheaval in Cochabamba but were absent in the case of Buenos
Aires. It will also question the appropriateness of water pnvatization policies in
impoverished nation where many

such an

individuals still receive water from such antiquated

processes as the collection of rainwater.
The analysis in these four chapters will explain why water privatization failed in
Buenos Aires. It will reveal the economic effect and the social consequences of water
concessions, and it will show why the topic of water privatization is important. These
concessions are controversial, as made evident in the case of both Buenos Aires and
Cochabamba, and this thesis will explain what makes the privatization of water different
than the privatization of other state-run industries.
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Chapter 1: Global Issues with Water, Privatization, and
Human Rights
Within the broad topic of water privatization, there are many smaller issues to
discuss. Water is historically considered to be a public resource; therefore, privatizing
raises social and philosophical questions, as well as the economic and business
implications of declaring private ownership to something essential to maintaining human

life. Unlike food, such as wheat and com, water is generally only received from
service provider. In the past, water service has been more

one

decentralized; however, over

time there has been a shift toward a central water source, which limits the options people
have in obtaining access to water.

Unlike most service industries, such as cable or

electricity, water is needed for survival; therefore, its position as a consumer product is
unique. Generally, water service contracts provide a monopoly for their product, yet this
product is vitally essential for the sustenance

of life. Given this precarious situation for

water service constituents, it is important that their water providing organization remains
efficient and effective in delivering a quality product. Additionally, if water is privatized,
it is important to determine what the effects of pricing variances will be on the poor once
rates are set outside full governmental control.
Is Water a Human Right?
The human body is 60% water, and as a requirement for virtually all body
fiinctions, water is an essential element for survival

Tt is necessary even for something

as elemental as thinking, given that the brain is 70% water. In fact, humans need 2.4
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liters of water every day to replenish what is used by the body.* This does not even take
into consideration the amount of water necessary for maintaining a basic standard of
living in the areas of hygiene and sanitation for such activities as bathing, cooking, and
eliminating waste.

It is within this context that some international governance regimes

have called for the recognition of a right to an adequate supply of water as part of the
right to an adequate standard of living,

They include the World Health Organization

(which established the International Drinking Water Supply and Sanitation Decade), the
United Nations Millennium Conference, the Johannesburg Summit, and the Third World
Water Forum, all of which believe that water should be considered a basic human nght.^
There is no international code, mandate, or provision that directly states an
be inferred from two
inherent right of humans to water, but this basic right can
preexisting international standards for human rights: the International Bill of Human
Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights. Article
3 of the International Bill of Human Rights(now known

as the Universal Declaration of

Human Rights) establishes the right to life: ‘Everyone has the right to life, liberty, and
security of person.” Article 25 addresses the issue of health: “Everyone has the right to a
standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself and of his family.
»3

including food, clothing, housing, and medical care and necessary social services...
One can argue that the guarantee for both rights of life and health require an adequate
daily intake of water. Without water, humans cannot live, much less maintain good

'“The Water in You.” US Geological Survey. 28 August 2006.
http://ga.water.usgs.gov/edu/propertyyou.html.
^ Erik B. Bluemel. “The Implications of Formulating a Human Right to Water.” Ecology Law Quarterly.
Vol. 31 (2004): 961.
^ “Universal Declaration of Human Rights.” United Nations General Assembly. 10 December 1948.
www.un.org/Overview/rights.html.
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health; therefore, one can infer that access to clean water is an integral element of basic
human rights. The International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights also
infers a right to water since it is essential to reaching primary economic and socio
cultural rights, such as housing and food. Water is necessary to maintain a clean and
functional house and to produce crops for food."* This document states:
an

The states Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of everyone to
adequate standard of living for himself and his family, including adequate food,
clothing housing, and to the continuous improvement of living conditions.
The problem with inferring the right to water from these two documents is that the
quantity dictated by each state as necessary for the adherence to these guidelines varies.
Since water is not a fundamental section of these two documents, the amount of water
required to comply with the overall guidelines is ambiguous. For example,the allusion to
water as a human right in the International Bill of Human Rights makes no indication of
the water amount necessary to sustain the explicitly stated rights to life and health, and it
is impossible to quantify the minimal amount required to drink, grow food, satisfy
sanitation standards, and meet other basic necessities. In order to live, humans require
daily nutritional intake, which either is or comes

from water. That amount is not clearly

defined, but there is definitely a minimum amount required.

Moreover, the right of

health carries the inference of water rights to a higher level, reaching a minimal standard
of health safety, which assumes provisions for safe and potable water as well as water
available for cleaning up waste and other disease-causing materials. But again, these

'* “The Implications of Formulating.” 968.
^ “International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights.” Office of the High Commissioner for
Human Rights. 16 December 1966. www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/a_cescr.htm.
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measures are general guidelines for public health without specific enumeration of water
rights.^
The International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights(ICESCR)
guarantees such rights as housing, food, and an adequate standard of living. Water most
obviously falls under the right to an adequate standard of living since it is essential to
human survival. Again, though, the quantity is left unclear and there are no details to
outline specific human rights to water. As for the other rights outlined by the ICESCR,
acceptable housing would ostensibly have running water, to what extent is unclear, but
some argue that the right to food does not include the right to water since food can be
produced in one area and brought to another.^
Finally, the United Nations Economic and Social Council, which operates under
ICESCR, has issued General Comment 15, which directly states the human nght to water.
General Comments made by the ECOSOC, however, are not recognized as international
law and are therefore unenforceable. They only serve

as an official interpretation of

guidelines set by the ICESCR,and in this capacity, they mandate three obligations: states
must respect, protect, and fulfill the right to water in order for this human right to be
completely recognized. Respecting this right involves assuring that pollution and other
barriers that could undermine the use of water do not occur or are dealt with in a timely
manner.

According to General Comment 15, companies or municipalities are not in

compliance with ICESCR if the water they are providing is polluted and unusable. The
obligation to protect the right of water creates a control for practices in the private sector
in regard to pollution as well as water access. Governments must ascertain that standards

6&(

The Implications of Formulating.” 969.
’Ibid. 969-970.
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are met for the sanitary and effective delivery of water to the public and that water
systems do not interfere with individuals seeking private access to water. Finally it
states:
Obligations to fulfill the right to water include a responsibility to facilitate
enjoyment of the right, promotion of the right through education measure, and
provision of the right where individuals or groups cannot realize their right due to
insufficient personal means.*
Although this comment is unenforceable, it is the key element in establishing the
human right to water because it indicates that even those who cannot afford water should
be provided access to a water source, a difficult issue with the discussion of privatization.
It is the ultimate goal of a private company to make a profit by charging consumers for
use of their product; therefore, without regulation,

an inherent problem with privatizing

water is a human rights violation against the poor who are unable to pay for water
service.
Does Privatization Automatically Disenfranchise the Poor?
Privatization is often associated with the efficiency and expertise that free market
capitalism is meant to engender, but sometimes reaching these goals produces umntended
consequences for those involved. Basic economics teach us that where supply meets
demand, agreement on price and quantity exists,

However, what if that agreed price

surpasses that which the poor are capable of pa)dng?

If the human right to water is

protected by the state, then the government would presumably intercede to insure

access

is available. However, if such government regulation is unlikely to occur, such as in the
third world, then an unaffordable price is possible.

Ibid. 971-973.
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In his work, “Stealing from the Poor? Game Theory and the Politics of Water
Markets in Chile,' Victor Galaz postulates that game theory is a “powerful” and
“frequent” approach to understanding the decisions water consumers and providers make.
Consumers only face the choice of whether to pay or not, but there are many areas where
water providers can fail to uphold the contract. Despite what a contract says about service
rates or areas covered, if it is more profitable, then providers will violate these
agreements. Game theory analyzes this decision, making two assumptions: TSTatural
resource users are self-interested actors who respond to the incentives and information
available to them, and... institutions- the rules, laws, and customs that govern people„9

help determine their incentives and information,

These two assumptions stipulate that

water consumers and service providers will seek the most favorable situation for
themselves that the government will allow. In highly developed societies, mimmum
contractual requirements are strictly enforced by law. Unfortunately, not all governments
are capable of fully enforcing the laws they establish; therefore, m less developed
countries, parties are not always held accountable for their illegal actions, such as a
company’s breach of contract in their pursuit of higher profits. Given this information,
assume two players: Water-consumers and water-providers. Each of these players has
two options; they can either cooperate with (C) or defect from (D) their contractual
obligations. They can abide by their agreement, or they can break it. But each player
makes this decision based on what they believe the other will do. To clarify, these
decisions can be represented as follows:

^ Victor Galaz. “Stealing from the Poor? Game Theory and the Politics of Water Markets in Chile.
Environmental Politics. Vol. 13.2(2004): 421.
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Figure 1: A Normal Form Water Market Game
Producer

Comply

Defect

Advantage to
Status Quo
Consumer

Provider

Comply

Advantage to
Conflict
Defect

Consumer

Each quadrant represents a different set of decisions for the consumer and
provider. In quadrant CC, both are cooperating with each other and all contracts, rules,
and regulations are followed.

Quadrants CD and DC represent mirroring situations

where one party upholds the contract while the other breaks it, each with opposite
advantages. If the consumer is the defecting party, then it has broken the contract to
achieve an advantage over the water provider. This situation is unlikely because the
service provider would immediately terminate water access, resulting in conflict as
shown in quadrant DD. But if the provider is the defecting party, then it has broken the
contract to achieve an advantage over the consumer by raising rates or refusing to extend
water service. This decision for each player is contingent on the reaction of the other;
each party wants to gain an advantage, but they have to decide if it is worth contending
with the defection of the other party. The option of cooperating or defecting is always
available, so if one side breaches the contract, the other side could accept the new
10

Ibid. 422.
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situation or it could breach the contract as well. If both the consumer and provider have
both broken their contractual agreements, then both have defected, the situation
11

represented by quadrant DD.
Unless both the water consumer and provider fully comply with their contract, the
most common situation is represented by quadrant DC, where the provider has

an

advantage over the consumer. Water consumers can only withhold payment, to which
providers immediately respond by terminating water service,

Therefore, whenever a

consumer breaches the contract, the provider soon does as well. Water-service providers,
however, have many obligations which they can choose to leave unfulfilled, but the most
obvious is maintaining water rates. While pursuing this advantage does risk involving
the government, it is unlikely in less developed societies where regulations are not as
strictly enforced. They form a risk-reward analysis to determine if the possible reward
from defection is worth the risk. Since a company s primary objective is to make a
profit, they weigh the possibility of financial consequences in relation to the possible
profits from these actions to determine their most lucrative course of action, despite its
legal and moral ramifications. If an unscrupulous corporation determines that it could
ultimately be more profitable to undermine contractual agreements, then it will do so
based on the assumption that either the government is too weak to enforce their contract
or that they will earn more money than they could potentially lose were the government
to intercede. Therefore, water service contracts in less developed nations automatically
place economically disadvantaged citizens in a precarious situation,

Companies can

“price out” low income consumers by raising rates above what they can afford, and if the

Ibid. 422-423.
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water provider chooses to make these rate increases, there is very little that consumers
can do.
What Factors Generate a Successful Water-Providing Service?
Water consumers can only hope that their providers will adhere to the contract
and efficiently deliver water to their service area, In order to be efficient, there are
several factors that contribute to the success of these orgamzations and insure that they
meet international standards for water service. According to a Pacific Institute report,
there are six determinants of a successful water-providing service, in either the public or
private sector: effective staffing, consistently sufficient funding, detailed

asset

management systems, performance measurements and rewards aligned to orgamzational
objectives, decision processes that are transparent and open to the public, and adherence
12

to an effective process for restructuring.
First, no matter how efficient or effective a program is organized, effective
staffing is crucial because if those charged with the responsibility of carrying out the
organization’s goals are not held accotmtable, then these goals will not be met. Extensive
training, increased staff, and clear communication between management and staff can
create drastic improvements in effective staffing. Second, successful water services must
maintain consistent and sufficient funding. Without working capital, there are no

means

of keeping up existing infi*astructure, building additional infi*astructure, compensating
employees, or covering general expenses, all of which are necessary in order to maintain
water service programs.
cV*r»iilH

coliitir»nc i-r*

When there are insufficient funds available, organizations
procure capital or reduce expenses.

12

Gary Wolff and Eric Hallstein. “Beyond Privatization: Restructuring Water Systems to Improve
Performance.” Pacific Institute. Dec. 2005.
www.pacinst.org/reports/bevond privatization/Bevond Privatization.pdf. 4.
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Third, asset management is the key to creating an efficient orgamzation; materials
must be distributed and used wisely to create the greatest value and achieve the most
important goals. In order to detect poor asset management, organizations should: make
regular inspections, use risk-based management systems, and create a clear distinction
between maintenance and capital spending. Fourth, in order to quantify the success or
failure of the asset management system, a quantitative assessment of performance toward
organizational goals with a correlating reward based on the completion of those
objectives should be established. This assessment should include: clear benchmarks and
indicators in reaching these objectives, performance-based compensation, raw water use
or pollution fines, and performance scorecards.
The most crucial determinant for the success of a water company is a decision
making process that is transparent and open to the public. People should know about
changes in pricing, the reasoning for such changes, and the additional or decreased
benefits they will receive. If people are forced to pay more for a service, they will be
more understanding if they know why; likewise, if they are charged less, they will want
to know if it is because of a decrease in service quality. Therefore, water-providing
services should maintain open and clear communications with their constituency, strictly
adhere to government regulations, distribute information on changes or modifications,
13

and incorporate third

parties in investigations and

organizational assessments.

However, if changes are needed, the sixth determinant is adherence to the proper cycle
for restructuring,

This cycle also has six steps: clarify symptoms, identify causes.

evaluate options, select solutions, implement solutions, and evaluate performance,

But

there is a tendency for organizations to begin at the fourth stage of selecting a solution.
Ibid.

16

which completely eliminates a proper evaluation of the situation,

As a result.

management creates solutions to problems that do not exist or attack secondary issues
that are not central to the problem at hand. An effective start begins with clarifying
symptoms and analyzing the cause and effect of the situation because it is essential to
14

have a full imderstanding of the problem before a solution can be engendered.
Managers, however, often skip these first steps because of a process known as
“satisficing,” which is the acceptance of a solution other than the best. When forced to
make decisions, managers of water companies are not given the luxury of perfect
information or flexible timelines. The data they receive can be incomplete, ambiguous,
or too overwhelming to fully analyze imder typical time constraints. In an ideal world,
water company managers would have the time to analyze and gather all relevant
information to the decision at hand. Unfortunately, perfect situations rarely exist, forcing
managers to use their intuition and make a decision that satisfices the problem at hand. It
15

may not be the best solution, but it will satisfy and suffice current needs,

Ideally,

managers would have time to implement all six steps of this cycle. Instead, they work
within the limitations they are given by eliminating the first few steps of the decision
making cycle and handle their choices through satisficing.

Ibid. 5.
Gareth R. Jones and Jennifer M. George. “Contemporary Management.” Boston; McGraw-Hill, 2008.
255-262.
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Chapter 2: From Military Power to Private Enterprise
Grinspun Policies
In December of 1983, Raiil Alfonsm, a member of the Radical Party, was elected
president of Argentina, ending a seven-year military regime and soon discovering the
economic malaise it had created. The two major issues with which Alfonsin was forced
to contend were inflation and foreign debt, which had both reached extreme levels under
the economic mismanagement of the military. By 1983, inflation had reached 343.8/o
and the national debt had increased by $40 billion to $46 billion, or around 80% of the
nation’s gross domestic product (GDP). These increases

are the result of imprudent

economic decisions made by the military government, such as the statization of private
foreign debt and the funding of Argentina’s loss in the Guerra de las Malvinas against
the British. The government took on private sector debt in attempts to spur growth m the
economy, and it attempted to claim the Malvinas to exude international power; however,
the failure of both created even greater economic troubles for the already deeply indebted
nation.

Given this highly leveraged position, the military regime was left with few

options to increase the nation’s available capital. It was already difficult to raise enough
tax revenue to cover domestic expenses and service foreign debt, but reducing state
expenditures was also a limited option since its programs were already under funded.
therefore, the only remaining solution was to expand the money supply and accept an
even greater rate of inflation.

* William C. Smith. “Democracy, Distributional Conflicts and Macroeconomic Policymaking in
Argentina, 1983-1989.” Journal ofInteramericon Studies and World Affairs. 32.2 (1990): 3-4.
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But imposing monetary policy of this nature opened up a floodgate of problems
referred to as the “culture of inflation.

When a government prints more money year

after year, people begin to expect further inflation and make decisions based on that
assumption. They increase prices and demand higher wages in order to contend with
future inflation, but these actions only exacerbate the problem. Then the government
must print even more money to cover the increase in prices and wages, which feeds into
the cycle. After seven years of triple digit inflation and a new administration that was
continuing in that direction, this cycle was perpetuated in Argentina. The effects trickled
down to a microeconomic level, and it became a self-fulfilling prophecy: Producers and
consumers believed inflation would occur; therefore, they safeguarded their own interests
and effectively created more of the inflation they feared. The new monetary policy raised
♦

2

the level of inflation to an unprecedented 626.7% in 1984.
in

Once Alfonsin assumed presidency over the newly democratized Argentina i i
December of 1993, he and Bernardo Grinspun, the new Minister of Economy, hastily
asserted their leadership in a new era of economic policy. Essentially, they abrogated
principal payments and postponed interest payments on

the national debt, which forced

the IMF and the US to intervene by issuing bridge loans and renegotiating payments.
Grinspun believed that by halting debt payments, the government would be fi*ee to infuse
more capital into key industries and revive the economy, With the successful re-ignition
of a few key industries, Grinspun hoped that there would be a cascading effect over the
entire economy.
V

AAAAAWAAC

AAV^

Similar policies had been effective in the past.

AV^AAgV^X

the intimate relations necessary

VVACJLA

However, the
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CAA AVJ.

unions to know where money was most needed to have the greatest effect on the
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economy. The Radical Party did not employ the support of business and entrepreneurial
leaders necessary to form a productive economic link between the government and
industry. There was no communication between the government and businesses to know
where capital should be infused, and there simply was not enough popular support from
opposition parties and industry leaders.
In June 1984, the Radicals also failed to gain approval of their proposed political
pact {Acta de Coincidenias) with the Peronists and other smaller political parties,
thereby failing to obtain the broad mandate which the government wanted (and
needed) in order to carry out its economic policies free from constant partisan
opposition in Congress.^
Alfonsin simply did not receive the political support he needed in order to carry
out his new economic policy; therefore he capitulated to international creditors,
Argentina resumed its debt payments, and Grinspun was forced to resign a few months
later in the beginning of 1985.
Sourrouille Policies
Grinspun was replaced by Juan V. Sourrouille, who attempted to refrain from
enacting such divisive measures and developed the Austral Plan to attack inflation.
Sourrouille believed that the culture of inflation or “memory system” that had been
created must be destroyed to effectively combat inflation,

His initiative sought to

combat inflation on two fronts: the Austral Plan would de-index prices in both public and
private sectors and would enact monetary reform pegging the Argentine peso to the US
dollar. As long as it was expected that everyone raised prices according to the index of
Argentina’s historical inflation rate, there was no hope of convincing anyone to stop. The
Austral Plan called for sweeping reform, changing the way the entire country viewed

^ Ibid. 7-8.
'●ibid. 10-12.
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inflation: to instill the necessary confidence, Sourrouille insisted on pegging the
Argentine peso to the dollar.

Instead of favoring the conventional methods of

protectionism and subsidies to protect Argentina’s fragile economy, Sourrouille
employed wage and price controls that targeted the root source of the hyperinflation.^ A
month later, in July of 1985, the Alfonsin administration created a new agreement,
receiving loans for $1.2 billion and $470 million from the IMF and US Treasury,
respectively.

Both organizations were highly supportive and confident that such

measures would bring down inflation and eventually spur growth. In the next six months.
their beliefs held to be true as the nation saw a drop in inflation rates from 30.5% in June
to 3.2% in December of 1985, which was essential to social appeasement after such
unpopular measures had been taken.^
Figure 2; 1985 Monthly Inflation Rates^
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The people of Argentina, initially skeptical of such radical reform, began to put
more and more confidence in the Alfonsin administration, a fact made evident by the
1985 congressional election where his party received 43% of the vote and the opposition
only 34%. But his support did not run as deep as he had hoped and did not include two
important groups with significant political power: private enterprise and organized labor.
Top executives in private enterprise understood the long-term benefits of Sourrouille’s
plan and were financially capable of enduring the effects of price controls on their
businesses. They had enough available capital to absorb the short-term losses which
would occur from these pricing policies and understood that, ultimately, such legislation
would not only benefit the economy but their businesses as well. Therefore, the Austral
Plan eventually received their support.^
In contrast, Alfonsin never received the support of organized labor, which did not
enjoy the financial flexibility of Argentina’s executive class. Those in the working class
could not afford the short-term ramifications of lower wages to enjoy the long-term
benefits of economic stability that were expected to prevail for both classes. If labor
leaders agreed to accept lower wages, then they would have to trust that prices would
eventually decrease as well. Understandably, the working class was not comfortable with
this situation since they were already having trouble making ends meets and would have
no way of knowing when the price changes would occur. Therefore, despite the fact that
the entrepreneurs had been placated, labor grew more and more adamant about regaining
previous wage levels to take advantage of currently lower prices. As prices dropped, so
did their income, but unionized labor sought to regain some of their wages in order to
improve their standard of living at the new, low price levels. As time passed and the
Ibid. 12-13.
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threat of strikes mounted, Alfonsm was forced to make a decision: continue with his
austere monetary policy or loosen regulation to appease the increasingly vocal labor
opposition.

Appeasement was ultimately chosen, steering the nation back toward

inflation with the loosening of price and wage controls. Instead of the strict system of
controls previously in play through the Austral Plan, Sourrouille opted to replace them
with a more diluted form of“administered” prices. These measures allowed inflation to
remain low initially, but eventually they rebounded and began to rise by 7.4% early in
1987. Meanwhile, the deficit declined only a mild 1.3%, constituting another economic
setback and further scrutiny from the IMF.^

Policy compromise was not working.

Sourrouille was in the middle of an ideological conflict between the importance reducing
inflation or easing social tensions, an issue that faced disagreement even among
Alfonsin’s appointed ministers. ‘Within the administration, Sourrouille and Minister of
„io

Labor Carlos Adelerte worked at cross-purposes, undermining the Plan.
Sourrouille’s final effort came in the form ofthe Plan Primavera, a capital-raising
effort to restore faith in the Argentine economy and Alfonsm administration. He sought
additional loans fi*om international organizations and banks. The US Treasury aided
Argentina’s situation by issuing a $500 million bridge loan to bring other international
creditors around to lending another $1.5 billion, all of which made the nation eligible for
$1.2 billion more from the IMF along with sundry credits and loans fi’om the World
Bank. All these loans were received despite the fact that Argentina had remitted payment
of interest on its foreign debts in April of 1988 and had not met IMF inflation targets.
fri'^/innr
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^ Ibid. 14-15.
Kendall W. Stiles. “Argentina’s Bargaining with the IMF.” Jouiiial ofInteramerican Studies and World
Affairs. 29.3 (1987): 78-79.
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To restore faith in the Argentine austral and promote domestic growth, measures
were taken to support a fixed valuation of the austral to the American dollar.

The

Argentine national bank began to freely exchange australs for dollars at a low rate backed
by dollars received from international loans, dollars that would eventually have to be paid
back. Speculators realized this situation and began frantically purchasing cheap dollars
to capitalize on the untenable rate that had been set; they bought more dollars with fewer
australs than they should have been able with the aid of unrealistic currency exchanges.
Therefore, instead of engendering faith in the austral to increase domestic growth,
individuals took their cheaply purchased dollars and invested them overseas in
politically and economically stable environments,

more

The net result was massive

government subsidy of the capital flight abroad and skyrocketing short-term

interest

rates, choking off investment and strengthening recessionary tendencies.
This run on Argentine banks for American dollars, often referred to as the Golpe
de Mercado, diminished any loyalties or confidence the Alfonsin administration had with
industrial sectors, and the US Treasury, IMF, and World Bank soon ended their funding
of dollars to support such rampant speculation, resulting in a doubling of inflation rates
and the acceptance of Sourrouille’s resignation. The Alfonsin’s administration attempted
to ameliorate Argentina’s economic situation with two different Ministers of Economy,
each with their own set of economic ideas and policies, to no avail. After six years, the
country had endured multiple changes in fiscal and monetary policy in attempts to control
inflation and create growth only to come up empty handed. On May 15, 1989, the people
of Argentina voted for change, electing Carlos Menem of the Peronist Party by a margin
of 15%. Still, inflation continued to rise as Alfonsin finished his term with consumer
‘Democracy, Distributional Conflicts.

25-27.
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prices increasing by 3,600% and wholesale prices by 5,000%. Through all its years of
economic troubles, Argentina had never seen levels of hyperinflation this high. And on
July 8, 1989,“along with the presidential sash, Raiil Alfonsin bequeathed Peronist Carlos
Menem the worst economic collapse ever recorded in Argentina’s long and tragic history
»,12

of man-made disasters.

The Menem Administration
Menem won his presidency through a grassroots campaign in an effort to
reconnect with the lower echelons of Argentine society. Having previously held the
position of governor in the poor province of La Rioja,^^ Menem eventually took office
with the aura of being a political outsider, something that appealed to the masses after
such an unstable economic period. Alfonsin had weathered the rough transition from
military dictatorship to democracy; however, he had failed to make the same progress
with the Argentine economy. It was now time to fully confront economic issues with
14

viable policies to reduce inflation and increase growth within Argentina.
After six years of failed economic policy, the people of Argentina wanted to

see a

real change in their standard of living and potential for economic growth. Faced with
economic collapse. President Menem felt that he had no option but to forsake his
campaign promises and seek the advice of the leading Argentine multinational Bunge &
15

Bom and his longtime liberal guru Alvaro Alsogaray.'

Menem had won his campaign

on a socialist platform with vague promises of championing causes for the poor, but soon
realized that there were much more dominant issues controlling the state of the economy.

Ibid. 28-29.
BBC News. “Profile: Carlos Menem.” 28 April 2003.
Ronaldo Munck. “Argentina Under Menem.” Latin American Perspectives. 24.6(1997): 8.
Ibid.
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Therefore, after appointing Nestor Rapanelli, a former vice-president of Bunge & Bom as
Minister of Economy, Menem enacted a policy labeled Plan BB, which was designed to
stabilize the nation’s rampant inflation in three ways: government controlled industries
raised prices for petroleum, electricity, and transportation; tax breaks and other business
incentives were put on a 180-day hiatus in order to cut the deficit; and the currency was
devalued by 170%. These were extreme measures, but they produced immediate results
as inflation plummeted fi-om 200% to 5.6% in just a four month period toward the end of
1990. Rapanelli was replaced the following year because of public disfavor, though his
16

policies were taken even further.
In 1991, Domingo Cavallo became the new Minister of Economy and initiated the
Cavallo Plan, which implemented policies toward economic liberalization. Key elements
of the Cavallo Plan included: shrinking of government employment and expenditures,
exposure of industries to foreign competition, creating an equal exchange rate for the
17

peso with the dollar, and privatization of state enterprises,

To begin this new era of

economic progress, Menem and Cavallo announced budget cuts of $6 billion by
drastically reducing the number of government employees. After only six months as
Minister of Economy, Cavallo oversaw the dismissal of nearly 70,000 workers from the
18

state payroll and promised to terminate another 130,000 by mid-1992.

To increase

international competition and trade, the Mercado Comun del Sur (MERCOSUR) was
established in March of 1991, opening up trade between Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and
Uruguay. Between 1992 and 1994 Argentina saw a 30% rise in exports, 75% of which

16

William C. Smith. “State, Market and Neoliberalism in Post-Transition Argentina: The Menem
Experiment. Journal ofInteramerican Studies and World Affairs. 33.5 (1991): 53-57.
Ronaldo Munck. “Argentina Under Menem.” Latin American Perspectives. 24.6(1997): 8-9.
“State, Market and Neoliberalism” 63-64.
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has been attributed to trade between MERCOSUR nations.

One of the cornerstones of

the Cavallo Plan was a law passed through monetary legislation known as the
Convertibility Law which declared three things: the peso now carried the same value as
the American dollar, pesos could be readily exchanged for these dollars, and the
Argentine Central Bank must maintain a foreign currency reserve no less than the value
of the domestic monetary base. Argentines could now jfreely exchange their currency,
knowing that the banks maintained enough American and other foreign currency to back
20

the peso float.

Finally, through urgings jfrom the IMF and World Bank, the Cavallo

Plan also mandated state reform through privatization, a process which had already begun
in 1989. At that time, the government had begun selling off state assets including
telecommunications, airlines, TV, radio, petrochemicals, steel, and

highways.

Privatization of Buenos Aires’ public water company, Obras Sanitarias, did not come
until the Cavallo Plan in 1993 when it was sold to the French conglomerate of Suez and
21

Vivendi to become Aguas Argentinas.
Washington Consensus
This international pressure for Argentina to sell many ofits state-owned industries
was part of a broader set of political ideals that have been retrospectively labeled the
“Washington Consensus,” a general term for policy packages presented to all developing
nations as a condition to receive more favorable debt restructuring. While a reduction in
state expenditures was one of the objectives of the Cavallo Plan, the primary reason was
to appease mounting pressure from the IMF, World Bank, and the US to receive more

Pamela K. Starr. “Government Coalitions and the Viability of Currency Boards: Argentina under the
Cavallo Plan.” Journal ofInteramerican Studies and World Affairs. 39.2(1997): 96.
20
Ibid. 87.
“State, Market and Neoliberalism” 54.
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favorable terms on international loans.

In the late 1980s, the term “Washington

Consensus” served to encapsulate the crystallization of a paradigmatic shift in economic
policy making regarding Latin America. The intellectual impetus behind the consensus
view clearly flowed from Washington, the locus of the US Treasury, the International
„22

Monetary Fund, and the World Bank.

These organizations used their influence to

guide Argentina and other developing countries of Latin America toward more liberal
economic policies, including extensive privatization. These nations desperately needed
the capital available through these international orgamzations; therefore, they were
willing to accept whatever stipulations were imposed on such loans.

Accordingly,

Cavallo accepted that in order to refinance Argentina’s international debt with

more

favorable conditions, it was necessary for the nation to privatize many of its state-run
23

companies.
These stipulations mandated by the IMF, World Bank, and US were based around
central political and economic models which these organizations wanted to recreate
within developing nations. According to John Williamson of the Peterson Institute for
International Economics, there are ten elements of policy change encompassed in the
Washington Consensus: reduction of fiscal deficits, reallocation of public expenditures,
tax reform, allowing the market to set interest rates, allowing the market to set exchange
rates, liberalization of trade policy, acceptance of foreign direct investment (FDI),
deregulation, increase in property rights, and of course privatization.
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James M. Cypher. “The Slow Death of the Washington Consensus on Latin America. Latin American
Perspectives. 25.6(1998): 47.
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The Washington Consensus placed great importance on fiscal discipline and
would not tolerate exorbitant fiscal deficits; therefore, officials in Washington believed
that plans should be made to determine sources for funding before programs were started.
But with limited funding, public expenditure priorities needed be set for the capital
available, and the nation needed to determine which programs were most important. But
funding could not come entirely through international loans, so in order to raise the
necessary tax revenue, Washington strongly encouraged enacting tax reform to create a
large tax base with only a moderately progressive marginal tax rate. In other words,
taxes should not have targeted a particular segment of society but should have distributed
the tax burden equally.
The consensus also stated that interest rates and exchange rates should both be set
by the market, given that the former remained positive to prevent capital flight to foreign
investments and that the latter should be kept at a level where the country’s exports
remained competitive. In addition, liberal trade policies were deemed appropriate to keep
markets open to foreign competition that strengthened domestic industries. If they did
not have to compete, there would be no reason to improve, but in order to remain
competitive, foreign direct investment was necessary to infuse capital into growing
markets and industries and strengthen their nascent economies.
Deregulation was also stressed by Washington officials for Latin American
policy, especially given the proclivity toward enacting price and wage controls.
Moreover, property rights were a key issue because they form the entire basis for
successful free market capitalism, and their importance must be stressed abroad. Finally,
the most important factor in the Washington Consensus pertaining to Obras Sanitarias

29

and Aguas Argentinas is privatization, something that was seen as an invaluable tool to
24

give immediate revenue to the government and a reduction to future capital obligations.
Privatization was enacted as a part of the Cavallo Plan to bring Argentina out of
economic peril and into an economic model acceptable to the IMF and World Bank. The
sale of Obras Sanitarias would generate immediate capital for the Argentine government
to infuse into its struggling economic infrastructure. In addition, the sale would relieve
the state of future funding and ostensibly allow the efficiencies of private enterprise

to

improve and reduce the cost of water services, saving the state from excessive costs and
the citizens of Buenos Aires from excessive monthly bills.

24
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Chapter 3: Aguas Argentinas: Privatization and
Deprivatization
Until 1993, Obras Sanitarias de la Nacion(OSN)provided water to the people of
Buenos Aires. It was a state-funded, public utility whose efficiency and capability of
providing water to the people of Buenos Aires grew more and more doubtful with
growing inflation and dwindling capital contribution firom the state. The province could
its constituents, while
not afford to keep up the infirastructure necessary to serve
contamination and flinctionability became major issues as the number of leaks and
broken pipes increased. The system lost 50% of the water it earned, countless broken
pipes were ignored, and shortages were common during the summer. They did not have
an adequate number of sewage connections, and the deficient treatment process often left
water impure and undrinkable.*
Moreover, the late 1980s saw a large migration of people fi-om the country to the
city. This phenomenon was observed over all of Latin America but not to the extent that
it occurred in Buenos Aires, and after a few years, the city population had grown by 9
million people, which was more than the government could accommodate. This demand
was too great for OSN, and it could no longer adequately provide water to the
constituents of Buenos Aires.

The city had outgrown the state-service providers’

capacity.

‘ “Dead in the Water.” Canadian Broadcasting Corporation News. 31 March 2004.
www.cbc.ca/fifth/deadinthe water/argentina.html
^ “Buenos Aires-Collapse of the Privatization Deal.” Food and Water Watch.
http://www.foodandwaterwatch.org/ water/waterprivatization/latinamerica/argentina/buenosaires.
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Buenos Aires could not maintain the infrastructure it had; much less could it raise
money for the construction of pipelines to service new areas. Buenos Aires had too many
people and too many preexisting problems with infrastructure to monetarily manage this
issue alone. They needed more capital and better management to continue providing the
people of Buenos Aires with water, a theme common across most state-run industries in
Argentina. The state was in a deep financial crisis with few options. The World Bank
offered Argentina a loan to release economic pressure with one condition: that the city of
Buenos Aires privatize its water along with its energy, telecommunications, mining, and
transportation sectors.^ These industries were losing state money and pushing the nation
further into debt; therefore, by forcing Argentina to sell them, the World Bank decreased
their lending risk. If the state did not have the responsibility of running unprofitable
industries, it would be more likely that they could repay their loans to the World Bank.
Argentina also needed the extra cash to support its recently installed the Law of
Convertibility in 1991, enacted to combat inflation. This initiative pegged the Argentine
peso to the American dollar; however, to insure its viability, the state needed a large
infusion of capital, which would add legitimacy to its efforts and stem the proliferation of
inflation. A sale of this magnitude would provide such funds, enabling the state to
justifiably peg their peso to the dollar and provide the World Bank with assurance that
their loans would be repaid."^
This sale did not release “ownership.” The contract provided for a temporary
concession where the state maintained ownership of the physical infrastructure while
relinquishing the right to provide water service to its constituents for a specific period of
The
^ Domingo F. Cavallo and Joaquin A. Cottani. “Argentina’s Convertibility Plan and the IMF.”
American Economic Review 87.2(1997); 17-22.
^ Carlos M. Vilas. “Water Privatization in Buenos Aires.” NACLA Report on the Americas. 34.
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time. This type of concession is fairly common with public utilities and should not be
confused with an absolute liquidation of all property and equipment associated with the
water industry.

Buenos Aires did not sell state-owned pipes, pumps, and treatment

plants; the state retained ownership of the water system’s infrastructure and sold use of
the system. The new private manager of this service, presumably operating at a profit,
would return a portion of its revenues back into the system, which under contractual
obligations, meant that in addition to providing general maintenance to the city’s existing
pipe system, they were to also make extensive repairs to existing pipes and insure
expansion into areas not covered.^
Privatization
Each prospective buyer placed a bid for the contract stating the amount of rate
reduction they could provide; the bidder with the highest rate reduction would win the
contract. After much lobbying from France to the Argentine government, a consortium
of the two French companies, Suez and Vivendi, won the contract promising a rate
reduction of 26.9%, creating the company Aguas Argentinas (AASA) to run the water
system.^ Vilas notes:
The company’s extensive links with the upper rungs of political power in France
and with multilateral financial institutions—^namely, the IMF and the World
Bank—^have proven extremely useful when Suez negotiates with impoverished
and highly indebted countries. The Aguas Argentinas concession was no
exception.^

^ lbid.,35.
^ “Buenos Aires-Collapse ofthe Privatization Deal.
^ “Water Privatization in Buenos Aires.” 36.
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They used their resources in order to make a deal that constituted the largest
transfer of water service to a private company ever made. It covered 9.3 million people,
including downtown Buenos Aires as well as fourteen other surrounding mumcipalities.
The drastic decrease in rates that AASA was able to provide cannot be completely
credited to the efficiency of capitalism; however, Food and Water Watch reports, “In the
two years previous to privatization, the government had artificially raised rates 62% in
„9

addition to adding an 18% sales tax to water bills.

The government used this tactic to

open public opinion to the idea of privatization by making it appear as if the state were
making an incredibly economically advantageous decision. In order to avoid an outcry
over privatization, the government of Buenos Aires raised prices to the point where any
bidder could have promised a rate cut.

Consultants from the Inter-American

Development Bank quoted in Vilas described increasing rates before privatization as “a
useful strategy for stemming possible opposition to the privatization process,

If

constituents are charged less, then they have a much weaker argument against the
privatization. Given the close connection between Suez and Argentina’s creditors, the
IMF and World Bank, it appears possible that some degree of collusion occurred between
the government of Buenos Aires, IMF, World Bank, and French conglomerate. The rate
increases preceding privatization could have been part of a tacit agreement between
Argentina and Suez even before the water concession had taken place.
This approach had no effect on organized labor, which provided the most fervent
opposition for AASA and declared battle against privatization “to the last drop of

“Dead in the Water.”
^ “Buenos Aires-Collapse of the Privatization Deal.
“Water Privatization in Buenos Aires.” 35.
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blood.

However, AASA was able to contend with the labor force by initiating the

Programa de Propriedad Participada (PPP), which incorporated the workers’ union
from OSN into the new operation by giving them a 10% stake of corporate stock and a
seat on board of directors to represent workers. PPP softened the blow of privatization
and facilitated the workers’ transition from OSN to AASA, mirroring similar programs
utilized in other cases of privatization to ‘T)uy” worker approval. Regardless, once the
transition was completed, AASA immediately dropped the workforce by 40% from its
12

previous level under OSN control.
Regulation

To oversee this agreement, the Argentine government set up a regulatory agency
called the Ente Tripartita de Obras y Servicios Sanitarios (ETOSS), which was to insure
13

that AASA adhered to its contract.

It contained two main stipulations: First, the rate

could not be changed for 10 years in order to minimize risk or recover losses from
management mistakes, a clause included to provide security that AASA did not win the
contract by promising an unfeasibly low rate only to later impose rate increases. These
types of risk should have been taken into consideration during the bidding process. Suez
and Vivendi knew AASA was an investment, and like any investment, it held a certain
degree of risk. Second, AASA was expected to make pipe repairs in order to reduce the
amount of water lost through leaks in the system and expand overall infrastructure. The
system had many preexisting problems and was in overall disrepair, so it became
AASA’s responsibility to correct these weaknesses.
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could not pay their monthly bill. The infrastructure was never extended to reach these
locations because they were not profitable. AASA,however, agreed to extend coverage
to these areas despite the lack of profit potential. Neither of these tasks, making repairs
or extending coverage, was monetarily promising, but ETOSS existed to track their
14

progress and insure the contract was followed.
But not a year later, AASA approached ETOSS requesting a rate increase even
though the contract specifically stated that there would be no real increase in service rates
15

for ten years,

AASA did not honor the contract agreements; they were requesting a rate

increase in order to compensate for “extra-contractual costs,

which consisted of

expenses related to extending service to poorer areas. ASSA maintained that they were
in need of reimbursement when they had not even met the contractual percentage
requirement of the population receiving service. These actions cause doubt whether
AASA ever had any intent of following the contract provisions.
Some observers contend that the offers were opportunistic, saying predatory
pricing reigned from the start; they also claim that the bidders and the
government understood mutually that the contracts would be renegotiated on
successive occasions anyway.’^
Therefore, not only did the government gradually increase water rates for the two
years prior to AASA’s takeover, it also understood that the “agreed rate decrease would
not be honored. Moreover, since ETOSS was funded through a 2.6% stake in the billings
of AASA, it is no surprise that they conceded to the rate increase, ETOSS received a
percentage of water service revenue; therefore, if rates increased, so did their budget.
Ultimately, when they had to choose between enforcing AASA’s contract and increasing

‘Water Privatization in Buenos Aires.” 36.
‘Buenos Aires-Collapse of the Privatization Deal.
‘Water Privatization in Buenos Aires.” 36.
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their funding, they chose the latter,

The result was an average 20.6% net profit as

percent of net worth from 1994-2001, compared to 6-12% common in the US,
18

represented in the chart below.
Figure 3; AASA Profits(1994-2002)
Year
Net Profit as % ofNet Worth
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002

20%
29%
25%
21%
13%
19%
21%
17%
-602%

A concession for an extra-contractual rate increases was made with the
understanding that two additional investments would be made: expedition of service
extensions to villas de emergencia (shanty towns) and gradual elimination of well water
19

which is high in nitrates,

However by 1996, “Aguas Argentinas had invested $300M

less on expansion of services than promised, or approximately 45% of the original
contract. The company used bad debt, late payments, and a downturn in the Argentine
economy to justify the difference. Despite this, the company’s profit margin remained
»20

above 20%.

They were not making the improvements they had promised. Instead, they kept
their profit margin high, citing outside factors for their lack of compliance. They were
ignoring contractual obligations and abusing the Argentine government’s lack of
regulatory control to increase revenue and minimize costs. Despite legal and moral
17
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transgressions, profit remained the priority.

Argentina had very little control over

AASA’s actions, so the company was able to elude regulation to make more money.
This situation was the core problem with their business agreement.
The World Bank did not reprimand the company, but instead publicly defended
21

AASA’s actions, approved a loan for $91IM, and bought 5% of the company s shares.
A World Bank representative commented:

It’s a game to get into the business... And
»22

[the water companies] have leverage once they get it.

The World Bank did not enforce

AASA’s contractual obligations before they were part owners, so ETOSS would have
even less effective recourse through the World Bank once they became 5% owners. The
Food and Water Watch observes that the share purchase made the World Bank “lender m.
partner in, and public relations are arm of their ‘model privatization project, Aguas
»23

Argentinas.

Essentially, to secure a loan, the World Bank made Buenos Aires

privatize its water services to a company of which they would eventually become part
owner.

This action allowed the World Bank to make money off both ends of the

agreement: their loan to Argentina and their stake in AASA. Given this situation, the
impartiality of their advice to Argentina and their motivation for urging privatization
seem highly questionable. In a proposal that was supposed to benefit Argentina by
alleviating the burden of international debt, the only two parties who profited were
AASA and the World Bank.
In February of 1997, President Menem further undermined the authority of
ETOSS by signing Decree 149 which placed the regulatory body under the direction of
Secretary of the Environment Maria Julia Alsogaray. Alsogaray was the daughter of
Buenos Aires-Collapse of the Privatization Deal.
Ibid.
23
Ibid.
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Alvar Alsogaray, former Minister of Economy, and known in the tabloids for having an
extravagant lifestyle and many well coimected friends. She was one of Menem’s close
political allies and was later indicted on charges of corruption, which brings in to
question her decisions while in charge of ETOSS.^"* In fact, “Dead in the Water” reports,
“In 2003, Maria Julia Alsogaray, who by that time was reviled by the Argentine media as
a symbol of the corrupt Menem government, was charged with several counts of
misappropriating government funds and other corruption and embezzlement-related
„25

charges.
A former director of ETOSS appeared before the Argentine Congress to testify on
ETOSS’ ineffectiveness and specifically where AASA had failed to adhere to contractual
obligations. He explained to congress that only a third of the promised pumping stations
and underground mains had been completed, only $9.4M of the agreed $48.9M had been
invested in sewage networks, and AASA was stalling to begin construction on
water treatment plant.

a new

The World Bank discovered that AASA was saving nearly

$100,000 per day by not opening this new plant, which amounts to S35M a year in
savings.
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The people of Buenos Aires were paying the price. They had to contend with

mounting pollution as AASA continued dumping sewage into rivers that should have
been treated by a plant they refused to build, a situation which created increasing
27

exposure to waterborne pathogens such as giardia lamblia and Cryptosporidium.
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“Buenos Aires-Collapse of the Privatization Deal.”
Tom Neltner. “A Quick Reference Guide.” Improving Kids’ Environment.
http://www.ikecoalition.org/Sewage Streams_Conf_200l/sewage_conf_commonjpathogens.htm
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Figure 4: ETOSS Evaluation of AASA (1993-2001)
Required by Contract

Total Amount Provided

88%

79%

74%

63%

% Primary Water Treatment

74%

7%

Investment(USD)

$2.2M

$1.3M

% Population with Water
Access
% Population with Sewage
Access

Still, ETOSS and the Argentine government did little to force AASA into
compliance. The French company continued providing service below levels guaranteed
by the contract, but ETOSS was rendered useless as AASA withheld financial statements
essential to properly evaluating the company’s progress. Meanwhile, the citizens of
Buenos Aires were forced to contend with contamination and water shortages that could
have been avoided with proper management. Of the six determinants to a successful
water-providing service determined by the Pacific Institute, AASA did not incorporate
three of them: sufficient funding, performance measurements, and transparent decision
processes. It did not invest enough capital to make the infrastructure improvements and
expansions required by the contract, restricting the company’s capability to reach more
constituents.

As a result, AASA was unable to reach performance goals set by its

contract. ETOSS made periodic evaluations of AASA’s performance; however, these
results were not consulted for improvement,

AASA did not take the public into

consideration when making business decisions and therefore guarded its financial
28

Water Privatization in Buenos Aires.” 39.
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statements to conceal company profitability. It did not want to publicize the profit it was
making at its constituents’ expense. Each of three factors was an infiraction against
AASA’s contract with Argentina and contributed to the company’s ultimate failure.
Many remained without service at all.

Since private companies have little

incentive to expand services into areas where it is doubtful that the constituents will be
able to pay, AASA was reluctant to fulfill that portion of the contract. The areas in
greatest need of water services were least likely to get it: AASA did not have incentives
to expand pipelines to cover them. Neither repairing nor expanding the infi'astructure of
Buenos Aires’ water system was an economically advantageous decision for the
company, and since ETOSS had very weak recourses to force them to comply, AASA
29

chose to ignore these contractual agreements.
None of the agreements made were economically beneficial for Argentina. Every
concession diminished risk for AASA and created greater liability for the Argentine
government and people of Buenos Aires. During renegotiations of 1997-1999, AASA
and ETOSS agreed to allow rate fluctuation based on average US prices according to the
“Producer Price Index of Industrial Commodities” and the “Consumer Price Index of
Water and Sewage Maintenance” to promote a standard of consistency. Fluctuations of
this nature were illegal under the Law of Convertibility, and Argentina had a lower rate
of inflation than the US, which meant that these terms guaranteed rate increases.
Essentially, the government of Buenos Aires was giving AASA another way to charge its
citizens more than was agreed in the original contract by allowing Argentine water rates
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the principal reasons for water privatization in the first place. In order to appease
29

Ibid. 36-39.
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growing social dissent, AASA did begin to offer a “social rate,” which was a discount for
poorer families, and the number of people with water service did marginally grow. The
disregard for contractual obligations was blatant though, and “it is clear that AASA
presented an offer that was technically and financially unviable, using its vast lobbying
capacity to push it through.” The promise to expand infrastmcture and lower rates was
simply a tactic to win the contract bid, imdermining the competitive nature of the
concession.

30

Consequences
Throughout the duration of the contract, AASA took out international loans in
order to cover company expenses instead of lower gross profit. As a consequence, at the
time of the Argentine economic crisis of 2001, AASA was deep in debt. Although these
loans allowed the company to maintain a high margin of profit, AASA did not spend its
revenue on endeavors related to improvements or other contractual obligations. They
obtained these loans from the World Bank, a part owner, and the European Investment
Bank (EIB), and in 2000, AASA found itself having a liabilities-to-net-worth ratio of
2.49, far in excess of the 0.80 agreed upon in the original concession contract. In other
words, just before the Argentine crisis, for every $2.49 they owed the World Bank and
EIB, AASA only had $1 worth of assets. This leveraged position became even worse
after the downturn of Argentina’s economy in 2001. When AASA originally accrued this
debt, the peso and dollar were equal through the Law of Convertibility.

However,

because of its economic instability, Argentina could not offer interest rates as low as
many other nations. To take advantage of this situation, AASA took out international
loans which it planned on paying back with the Argentine peso, relying on it too hold its
30

Ibid. 37-39.
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value.

However, when the Argentine government devalued its peso, AASA owed a

proportionally increased amount in international debt. Vilas explains, “The strategy
permitted the company to avoid parting with its own capital to cover the financial
excesses of the concession. But that same strategy put AASA in an extremely vulnerable
position when the economic crisis hit Argentina at the end of 2001, leading the
government to end convertibility and devalue the currency early the following year.”
31

AASA ended up defaulting on $700 million in debt.
AASA blamed the Argentine government and began the process to take their case
to the International Center of the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), an arm of
the World Bank that handles investment disputes between compames and their host
countries. AASA sought reparations for the consequences ofthe 2002 devaluation which
decreased their ability to repay international loans in two ways. First, the pesos received
in service revenue after devaluation no longer held the same value as an American dollar
because the Law of Convertibility was no longer in effect. Second, since it took out
international loans to receive lower interest rates, without the peso pegged to the dollar,
the new exchange rate created a greater amount of debt. Therefore, their debt was
compounded in two ways: AASA was earning less when they owed more, and they
wanted the Argentine government to pay for the decisions that led to this situation. In
response, Argentina did not recognize ICSID’s jurisdiction over the conflict,

The

government maintained that “devaluation and the end of convertibility were decisions
taken by a sovereign authority under constitutional provisions and not under the terms of
„32
C4AXJT
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Nlcreover, /\rgentina pointed out ICSID’s blatant conflict in interest.
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a part of the World Bank, they were also part owners of AASA. It would not be fair for
the arbitrator to have a financial stake in one of the conflicting parties. The case never
went to ICSID. In April 2006, under the administration of President Nestor Kirchner
(2003-2007), who believed the state could provide more adequate service to the people of
Buenos Aires, the contract with AASA was rescinded. The constituents of AASA had
33

suffered enough, and the government took charge to renationalize the water company.
According to NotiSur,

[t]his [was] the fourth major deprivatization or

renationalization of a private company that Kirchner’s government has conducted under a
policy of retaking government control of utilities that had been sold to private interests
„34

during the 1990s.

The privatizations made under the administration of Carlos Menem

(1989-1999) under a wave of neoliberal economic reforms had not materialized into
financially or politically advantageous decisions, so Kirchner retook control of
Argentina’s public industries. He began by renationalizing the national postal service,
which had been run by the Macri Group, a company owned by a political rival, then
continued in 2004 by taking back control of key broadcast frequencies, owned by the
French company Thales Spectrum, and the San Martin Railroad, owned by the domestic
35

company Metropolitano.

But to take the place of AASA in providing water to the city of Buenos Aires, the
company Aguas y Saneamiento Argentines (AySA) was established enabling the
government to hold 90% of its stock. And with this control,“The government announced
a 400 million peso (US$130 million) investment plan to overcome the problems of the
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previous system. US $13 million will be aimed at projects to expand service through the
»>36

oversight of neighborhood cooperatives and organizations,

Providing lower rates and

extended service, AySA plans on fulfilling the promises AASA made but never kept.
As a state-run company, AySA will be closely monitored by the Argentine
government, insuring that water rates do not exceed a reasonable range for the
constituents of Buenos Aires. Therefore, there is no worry that a lack of regulation will
lead to the disenfranchisement of the poor from their basic human right to water. For
now, privatization policies have been set aside for a time when the Argentine government
has enough power to regulate such international agreements. Argentina has retaken
control of the water service in Buenos Aires to strictly regulate the company’s actions
and insure that its citizens receive their human right to water.

36

Ibid.
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Chapter 4: Water War in Cochabamba,Bolivia
The failure of water privatization is not unique to Buenos Aires. The privatization
and subsequent state repurchase of water companies happened repeatedly in Latin
America throughout the 1990s.

Industry privatization was a common

World Bank

requirement for securing much needed international loans by struggling Latin American
nations; therefore, after this surge of privatization, many heads of state reversed these
unpopular measures to contend with social upheaval. However, the length of time over
which social dissent mounted and effected change varied from country to country. In the
case of Buenos Aires, this process lasted for nearly ten years, but in Cochabamba,
Bolivia, the renationalization happened after a few months,

Politicians made the

economic policy, water rights were sold, and less than a year later, it was all overturned.
The most obvious difference between the two situations is the scale of the protests
and demonstrations that took place in Cochabamba. Members of every socio-economic
class realized the injustice of such practices and declared water privatization a violation
of human rights, protesting until the government finally conceded. The same is tme in
Buenos Aires; however, protests never reached the same level of intensity and lasted for
nearly ten years. In Bolivia, the rioting and protests escalated into a national conflict
within one year, eventually becoming known as the “Water Wars” as citizens waged a
virtual civil war over their basic human right to freely access water. An understanding of
this disparity between the occurrences in Buenos Aires and those in Cochabamba gives
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greater insight into the process of water privatization and its social implications on the
population it serves.
Water Concessions
In compliance with the World Bank privatization stipulations required for loans
throughout the 1990s, in October of 1999, Bolivia enacted Law 2029 that governed the
ownership, distribution, and use of potable water and sewage systems throu^out the
country.^

It created a system for the sale of concessions, reserved for cities with over

10,000 people for a period of 40 years, and licenses, delegated to the remaining regions
of the nation for periods of5 years, that regulated every facet of water use in the nation.
At the time, only half the population of Cochabamba used central water services
provided in the area.

The other half gained water access through cooperatives and

neighborhood associations, organized and built through efforts in rural commumties in
pooling money and concentrating resources to build wells and water cisterns. These
groups had no concept of water ownership and believed that water should be free to all.
Given its inherent characteristics and necessity for the sustaining of life, they believed
that, “[t]he traditional social practices and ideas behind the use of water go beyond the
distribution of water to encompass the idea that water belongs to the commumty and no
,»3

one has the right to own the water.

After years of these groups living in remote locations sharing their water
resources and only requiring enough money for the construction and maintenance of
wells, the government was now granting exclusive water rights to the owners of

Oscar Olivera. Cochabamba: Water War in Bolivia. Cambridge: South End Press, 2004. 8.
^ Willem Assies. ‘David versus Goliath in Cochabamba: Water Rights, Neoliberalism, and the Revival of
Social Protest in Bolivia.” Latin American Perspectives 30.3(2003): 17.
^ Oscar Olivera. 8.
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concessions and licenses for each area. The cooperatives and associations were no longer
allowed to operate under Law 2029 but were forced to enter into contractual agreements
and pay fees as common users of centralized water systems. ^ The wells and cisterns
which they had built with their own capital and labor could no longer be used without the
permission of whomever owned the water rights for their area. Moreover, peasants were
denied the right to set up receptacles to collect rain in even the most rural of areas, which
is tantamount to the privatization of rainfall. What was once seen as traditional peasant
right by the Bolivian government must now be licensed in order to be legal, and in order
to distribute these concessions and licenses, the Bolivian government created the
Superintendency for Basic Sanitation which monitored such sales and enforced their
autonomy.^
The consummate example of problems with these water concessions can be
observed in the case of Cochabamba, the country’s third-largest city located 350 miles
east of La Paz in central Bolivia.^ On September 3,1999 the Bolivian government signed
a 40 year contract to concede the water rights of Cochabamba to Aguas del Tunari
(ATSA), a consortium of companies from across the world that was registered in the
Cayman Islands. Major holders included International Water of Spain, a subsidiary of
Bechtel Corporation in the US, and four domestic Bolivian companies, one of which was
owned by Samuel Doria Medina, a leading member of the political party Movimiento
Izquierda Revolucionaha. The potential profit from such an agreement did not increase

Willem Assies. 14-36.
^ Oscar Olivera. 8.
^ Public Citizen: Critical Mass Energy and Environment Program. “Water Privatization Case Study:
Cochabamba, Bolivia.” www.citizen.org/documents/Bolivia_(PDF).PDF. 2.
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trust from the Bolivian population that was already distraught from their loss of basic
water rights, especially once the stipulations ofthe agreement came to light.
The contract guaranteed a 16% rate of return on investment to ATSA,regardless
of service provided or company efficiency. This type of contract provided no incentive
for ATSA to perform its role as water service provider, which is a key aspect of
privatization efficiency. It essentially guaranteed a demand that would ordinarily decline,
decreasing the price, when obligations were not met. Given this breach of free market
fundamentals and the previously stated ownership affiliation with a ruling party official,
it is difficult not to question the motives and priorities of those who enacted Law 2029
and conceded water rights in Cochabamba. It appears that their decisions were motivated
by profits and not by just distribution of water rights. Additionally, in an effort to cater to
the corporations buying concessions, the Superintendency “dollarized” water bills to
effectively peg water prices to the US dollar. This policy had no effect on currency
valuation; however, it assured corporations that even if the Bolivian currency (boliviano)
were to devalue, water rates would remain the same in terms of US dollars. Prices would
increase to maintain an equal profit in US dollars. Such practices delighted foreign
companies investing in Bolivian water concessions, but common Bolivians making a
minimum wage of 330 bolivianos ($41USD)per month were outraged. If the exchange
rate between the boliviano and the dollar declined, water bills would increase, but wages
would stay the same; therefore wageworkers would not be able to purchase an equal
amount of water based on the same income.^

^ Oscar Olivera. 8-9.
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La Toma de Cochabamba
Immediately after ATSA took control, the people of Cochabamba received water
rate increases of 100-200%, prices many could not afford.^ They believed they had been
denied a basic human right and decided to act: On February 4, 2000, low-income
workers from the city and countryside gathered to occupy the city of Cochabamba.
People protested in the city center to prove that they would not obsequiously comply with
the sale of “their” water to ATSA. La toma de Cochabamba began as a nonviolent
protest where participants waved white handkerchiefs, threw flowers, and played music
as a celebration of their refusal to acquiesce. They had no plans for inciting violence or
causing destruction, but the Bolivian officials made preparations for the worst case
scenario.

Even before the arrival of protestors, the government called in the Grupo

Especial de Seguridad (GES; Special Security Forces).

They also deployed the

ddlmatas--Tpo\ice on motorcycles nicknamed Dalmatians for the style of their uniform—to
10

prevent protestors from entering the city.
With protestors and police concentrated in one city center and taunting from both
sides, violence broke out as the fight for water began. The first move was made by
Bolivia’s head of state at the time. President Banzer, who ordered police to use tear gas
on those peacefully protesting. Over the course of the day, 175 protestors were injured.
II

including two that were blinded because of tear gas exposure,

But this sudden outbreak

was a catalyst that further united those from the country with those living in the city.
People watching fi*om their windows, listening to the protestors’ message, slowly began

® “Water Privatization Fiascos: Broken Promises and Social Turmoil.” Public Citizen’s Water for All
Program. March 2003. www.wateractivist.org.
^ Oscar Olivera. 33.
Ibid. 32-33.
"Public Citizen: 3.
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to join the protest, and everyone became involved. Families brought buckets of water
into the streets for participants to drink and wash off the tear gas, and even bank workers
began throwing down computer paper, bank stationary, and account reports as burning
material to decrease effects from the tear gas. People of all ages joined in to protest:
Young men were in the plaza battling police, the core location for all the protesting; the
elderly stood 300 meters away from the conflict, banging pots and screaming; and even
kids were building barricades or collecting stones for their older siblings and parents. It
began with demonstrations from those most disenfranchised by Law 2029, but it turned
into a mainstream revolt against what was seen as a violation of basic human rights. Two
days later, Bolivian officials signed an agreement that would enact a freeze on water rate
12

increases within a two month period.
But after two months, nothing had been done, So once again on April 4,
protestors returned to the streets of Cochabamba, reasserting their claim for access to
water. One major factor had changed: the government did not deploy police or military
personnel to deter protesting forces because, from prior experience, they learned such
conflicts only serve to escalate and exacerbate the problem.

As a result, the

Coordinadora, which was a group formed in the prior two months to provide structure to
the protestors’ cause, decided to takeover the offices of ATSA,a precarious situation that
could have led to unnecessary destruction of community property and a detrimental blow
to the legitimacy of their cause. If the Coordinadora began partaking in nonproductive
and vandalizing activities, then the group would not be taken seriously; however, “[t]hey
viivt tcirvv./

A

" del Tunari over, s^Tnbclically occupying the company’s offices, ripping

down is big sign, and everything.
Oscar Olivera. 34-36.

They did not destroy the offices because social
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controls existed within the crowd to guard against the kind of destruction that would be
detrimental to [their] cause,

13

The Coordinadora knew that destruction of property was

not going to make any progress toward regaining water rights. Its only strength was
popular support, and such a display of uncontrolled actions could only undermine it.
Following this display, municipal officials granted leaders from the Coordinadora
a meeting to discuss demands and establish an open report on the water issue.
Unfortunately, as the meeting began, police entered the room and arrested all those
involved with the water privatization protests. This meeting, disguised as a forum for
creating solutions to the problems witli ATSA, was really a setup for the arrest of all
14

major Coordinadora officials,

Protest lost momentum, evident in the decrease in

participants from 20,000 on day one to 5,000 on day two; but the arrest of its leaders
reinvigorated the Coordinadora, and on day three 40,000 protestors filled the main plaza
calling for the expulsion of ATSA and demanding their right to water. Cochabamba
became a war zone, and its citizens were making adequate preparations: people were
carrying bottles ready to throw on the ground, barbed wire was being strung across street
intersections, some wore leather gloves to throw back gas camsters, women stood ready
with buckets of water to wash off the toxic gas.

You could see on every comer the role

that each family had been assigned. Children, old folks, young men and women-all of
„15

them had their faces painted as in war.
Over the next few days, violence from water protests proliferated from
Cochabamba throughout the nation, and President Banzer issued a decree of martial law.
The government placed Bolivia under a state of emergency, suspending the civil rights of
Ibid. 37-39.
Public Citizen. 3.
Oscar Olivera. 40-41.
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many including those suspected of being a part of the Coordinadora. Police began
breaking into the homes of movement leaders, making arrests without warrants, enacting
curfews, and setting restrictions on travel. Banzer even placed restrictions on assemblies,
making it illegal to hold meetings of four or more, and threats were made to journalist all
over the country, including a bomb threat called into Presencia, the La Paz daily
newspaper. The country was in chaos. Throughout this period, numerous demonstrators
were injured and six were killed, including a teenage boy who was shot in the head.^^ A
peaceful protest over the price of water had plunged an entire nation into political
turmoil. NotiSur at the time put it this way: ‘Demonstrations, strikes, and roadblocks
have almost paralyzed the country and caused food shortages in several cities. Demands
for changes in government policies [were] becoming more strident with some sectors
„17

calling for President Hugo Banzer to step down.

Discontent had reached untenable

levels, and the government acknowledged that something had to be done.
Resolution
On April 9, 2000, government officials called for a meeting with the leader ofthe
Coordinadora. However, he needed assurances that a similar situation to their last
“meeting” did not occur where everyone involved was arrested. Therefore, Vice Minister
Jose Orias agreed to meet in a building downtown near the main plaza in the presence of
two nonpartisan, foreign observers. The rest of the Coordinadora would wait for their
decision in the plaza as an assurance to legitimate negotiation as well as his safety.
During the discussion, there were two distinct factions making negotiations with
X t

oi
w.x.oials
took a divisive stance refusing to negotiate

Public Citizen: 3-4.
“Bolivia: Social Unrest Convulses Country.” NotiSur. 29 Sept. 2000.
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no matter how many deaths or what destruction such a decision may have brought. They
maintained a hard line approach in attempts to exude an undue air of authority.
Fortunately, those with the most influence over President Banzer’s decision were more
open to compromise and understood the force which the Coordinadora represented.
They were not eager to comply with every request made by this orgamzation, but in the
end the Coordinadora received exactly what they wanted. ATSA was forced to leave
and a board of directors was formed to direct the orgamzation of a water system within
the city that consisted of two Coordinadora members, two representatives from the
mayor’s office, and two unionized workers from the public water company. As with any
negotiation involving such a large number of individuals, there were those left unsatisfied
with these results. The most extreme protestors wanted the public water system to be
controlled completely by the Coordinadoi'a. However, since it formed as a political
18

interest group, the Coordinadora had no expertise as a public service-providing entity.
The main objective was achieved: ATSA’s water concession was retracted, and the
company was expelled from Cochabamba.
In 2002, Bechtel Corporation, the principal shareholder of ATSA, filed suite
against the government of Bolivia in the International Centre for Settlement of
Investment Disputes (ICSID), claiming $50 million in compensation for capital
investments and future lost earnings in the water company. The court’s findings are not
known because of the nature of ICSED proceedings which are closed-door, meaning
neither leaders of the Coordinadora nor the press was made aware of the courts progress.
However, after a report that these international proceedings had already cost Bechtel $1
million in legal fees, the international outcry and public scrutiny on the company’s
Oscar Olivera. 45-46.
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actions began to take effect, and on January 19, 2006, the conglomerate agreed to settle
the case for nominal damages of 2 bolivianos ($.30USD). Officially, ATSA won the
case, but the moral victory lay on the side of the Coordinadora and the public right to
19

water for which they had fought.

The organization regained control over their water

rights and paid virtually nothing to the company from which they reclaimed them, despite
the fact that it lost millions in revenue earning potential.
The events that transpired in Cochabamba had a much greater social impact than
in Buenos Aires.

Everything took place at an escalated level: rate increases, social

dissention, organized confrontation, and an international trial; all of these factors
contributed to the social upheaval that was witnessed throughout Bolivia. Immediately
after ATSA took control, the lives of those on the outer fringe of society were made
impossible; rate increases were such that people spent a great percentage of their income
on water, creating a mass mobilization that eventually gained support from the upper
classes distraught by the disregard of basic water rights,

In Buenos Aires, the

disenfranchisement of the poor was a gradual process that progressively affected more
and more people over a ten year period. However, they eventually began to understand
the severity of what was occurring and challenged the privatization of their water system
through various protests, similar to the Coordinadora in Cochabamba. They even held a
public forum to voice complaints against AASA in the City Legislature of Buenos
20

Aires.

Therefore, each nation opposed privatization and eventually brought it to an end,

but the scale of social upheaval and the length of time it took to achieve these objectives
are starkly different
The Democracy Center. “Investigations: Bechtel vs. Bolivia.” http://www.democracyctr.org/bolivia/
investigations/water/bechtel-vs-bolivia.htm
20
Reclamos Contra Aguas Argentinas en Una Audiencia Publica.” La Nacion. 12 Feb. 2003.
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Conclusion
The privatization of water in Buenos Aires was proposed to Argentina by the
IMF, World Bank, and US as a means to decrease the nation’s economic troubles and
increase the quality of water service to those living in the city. This result did not
materialize. AASA failed to deliver promises made in the concession and, in the process,
denied water access to lower income citizens who could not afford higher service rates.
These actions ultimately forced Argentina to rescind its contract and retake control of the
industry.
This would suggest that privatization was not an appropriate economic policy for
Argentina at this time. Its contract made stipulations that the government could not
enforce.

Had the contract been followed, the water privatization policy would have

worked. The problem was a lack of government regulation to oversee such an agreement.
High demand kept prices above agreed levels, and without government oversight, AASA
was able to increase rates accordingly without legal ramifications. Lack of government
protection from such price increases deprived the poor of access to water and violated a
basic human right. Eventually, this situation provoked enough social unrest to overturn
such policies, eliminating all long-term economic benefits for water privatization and
proving that the privatization of water is not viable in the absence of government
regulation. It does not ameliorate economic difficulties but only creates social unrest.
Instead of regulation, the case of Cochabamba emphasizes the need to understand
the socio-economic background of the society in which water privatization is proposed.
As one of Latin America’s poorest countries with 65% of the population living in
poverty, Bolivia is much less economically developed than Argentina. Moreover, it also
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has one of the most unequal income distributions in Latin America.^ As such, a large
portion of its citizens do not receive water from a centralized source. They rely on
communal water pumps and precipitation receptacles, maintained by the communities in
which they live. Therefore, water privatization was not a logical policy for Bolivia.
Previously, this portion of the population only had to pay for the expense of building and
maintaining pumps, or they collected rainfall for free. But now they were forced to pay
exorbitant rates for the same water to the water license holders in their region, an
unnatural progression in such an undeveloped region. Buenos Aires, on the other hand,
previously had centralized water service. Therefore, the transition to a private company,
despite its ultimate success or failure, was at least a more reasonable transition.
In addition to a lack of centralization, Bolivia also had a much poorer population.
The lower minimum wage levels in Bolivia priced out a greater number of water service
constituents from the very beginning of water privatization. Once privatization policies
were implemented, there was an immediate effect on Bolivia’s large, low-income
population. This shows that the effects of water privatization without price regulation are
exacerbated in societies were family incomes are lower and more citizens are denied their
human right to water.
In these two situations, the privatization of water was not an effective economic
policy. In Buenos Aires, a lack of regulation caused prices to rise above levels that
poorer constituents were able to pay. AASA charged rates that exceeded what their
contract stipulated, knowing that the Argentine government was too weak to control it.
Over time as more a.nd more citizens were priced out of water service, social tiinnoil

'“Bolivia Poverty Assessment; Establishing the Basis for Pro-Poor Growth.” http://go.worldbank.org/
PVQ19OO4U0.
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caused a reversal of these policies.

On the other hand, Cochabamba illustrates the

tumultuous effects of privatizing water in undeveloped areas where water is largely a
shared commodity. Once virtually free, water now carried a price above what most ofthe
population could afford, forcing the Coordinadora to fight for its human right to water.
While privatization could be an appropriate course of action in other societies with better
means for regulation and a developed water system already in place, the privatization of
water was not a successful economic policy in Buenos Aires or Cochabamba.
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